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THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT 
ACT AND THE CLASH BETWEEN AUTHORS 
AND INNOVATORS: THE NEED FOR A 
LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT TO THE SAFE 
HARBOR PROVISIONS 
Jessica Di Palma 
          The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) was 
enacted with the goal of bringing copyright law into the digital age. 
Through the DMCA, Congress attempted to balance the interests of 
what were considered to be the traditional copyright holders—
musicians, film studios, record companies, and television networks—
with those of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) by combining key digital 
copyright protections with a series of “safe harbor” protections for 
qualifying ISPs. Over the past decade, conflicting and convoluted 
judicial interpretations of the safe harbor provisions have resulted in 
unpredictable legal standards and a deep divide between traditional 
media and new technology. This Note explores these judicial decisions 
and proposes a legislative amendment to the DMCA safe harbors. 
Further, this Note argues that to allow new technologies to evolve and 
to create an environment of economic prosperity for both old and new 
media—Congress must amend the vague safe harbor provisions with 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A teenager records and uploads an episode of his favorite 
television show to his YouTube account for his friends to watch. A 
mother posts a home video on YouTube of her eighteen-month-old 
son dancing to a hit song by pop star Prince to share with friends and 
family.1 A music lover uploads digital music files of her favorite 
popular songs to a music-sharing website for other music fans to 
download.2 
These are just a handful of the types of media that individuals 
can upload and access on YouTube.com.3 Three former employees 
of the successful online payment service PayPal founded YouTube in 
2005.4 In a press release accompanying the site’s official launch in 
December 2005, its founders described YouTube as a “consumer 
media company . . . that allows people to watch, upload, and share 
personal video clips at www.YouTube.com and across the Internet.”5 
Less than one year after the site’s official launch, Google acquired 
YouTube in a stock-for-stock transaction valued at $1.65 billion.6 
YouTube has since become a popular and profitable global forum 
with site traffic reaching more than one billion daily digital video 
views in 2010.7 While the YouTube creators had intended it to be a 
forum for users to upload their own original content, it has also 
 
 1. See Chris Francescani, The Home Video Prince Doesn't Want You to See, ABC NEWS 
(Oct. 26, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/home-video-prince/story?id=3777651 
(describing a high-profile case in which YouTube informed the user that her video had been 
removed from the site at the request of Universal Music Publishing Group because the video 
infringed its copyright, which caused the user to file a civil lawsuit against the music publisher, 
claiming it was abusing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act by sending out massive amounts of 
what are known in the industry as “take down notices” to websites such as YouTube). 
 2. See Barnesfam, Janet Jackson - Go Deep, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www 
.youtube.com/watch?v=ApsK6qTaIZ4 (demonstrating YouTube users’ common practice of 
uploading copyright-protected popular songs online). This user added the disclaimer “No 
Copyright Infringement intended” under this video. Id. 
 3. See About YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/about/ (last visited 
July 25, 2013) (“YouTube provides a forum for people to connect, inform, and inspire others 
across the globe and acts as a distribution platform for original content creators and advertisers 
large and small.”). 
 4. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2012); About YouTube, 
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/about/ (last visited July 25, 2013). 
 5. YouTube Opens Internet Video to the Masses, MARKETWIRE (Dec. 15, 2005, 8:00 PM), 
http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/youtube-opens-internet-video-to-the-masses-674526 
.htm; see also Viacom, 676 F.3d at 28 (describing YouTube’s history and services). 
 6. Press Release: Google Acquires YouTube, TIME (Oct. 9, 2006), http://www.time.com 
/time/business/article/0,8599,1544289,00.html. 
 7. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 28. 
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evolved into a breeding ground for digital piracy of copyrighted 
material.8 
As technology has evolved and the Internet age has progressed, 
copyright law has attempted to keep up. Congress enacted the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)9 in 1998 to bring federal 
copyright law into the digital age.10 Through the DMCA, Congress 
tried to balance the interests of what were considered to be the 
traditional copyright holders—authors, book publishers, film studios, 
musicians, record companies, and television networks—with those of 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) by combining two key digital 
copyright protections with a series of “safe harbor”11 protections for 
qualifying ISPs.12 However, Congress failed to adequately define the 
requirements an ISP must meet to fall within a safe harbor 
provision,13 which has left the door open for courts to tailor these 
requirements appropriately to meet the needs of evolving 
technologies.14 However, the courts have failed to do so.15 In a series 
of recent high-profile decisions, the United States Courts of Appeals 
for the Second and Ninth Circuits initially disagreed on the 
interpretation of statutory phrases limiting ISPs’ liability for 
 
 8. See id. at 29 (describing that plaintiff Viacom alleged it had identified more than 63,497 
video clips containing copyright-protected material that had been “copied, stored, displayed, or 
performed on YouTube without authorization”). 
 9. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 10. See generally David Kravets, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA Is the Law That 
Saved the Web, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2008, 3:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/10/ten 
-years-later/ (arguing that recent online innovation and the rise of major Internet companies like 
Google would not have occurred without the DMCA safe harbors). 
 11. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1453 (9th ed. 2009) (defining safe harbor as “[a] provision 
(as in a statute or regulation) that affords protection from liability or penalty”). 
 12. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2, 8−11 (1998). 
 13. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 14. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[R]ather than embarking 
on a wholesale clarification of the various doctrines of copyright liability, Congress opted to 
leave current law in its evolving state and, instead, to create a series of safe harbors for certain 
common activities of service providers.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19 (1998)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 15. See John Blevins, Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism: The New Expansion of 
Secondary Copyright Liability to Internet Platforms, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1821, 1879 (2013) 
(noting that “the DMCA is not a model of textual clarity”); Liz Brodzinski, UMG Recordings, 
Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.: The Future of Investor Liability for User-Generated Content, 21 
DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 76 (2010) (arguing for the “need for further 
Congressional consideration of the investor liability question in the form of an amendment” to the 
DMCA); Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 329 
n.77 (2013) (“The section 512 safe harbors in particular have generated more than their fair share 
of litigation . . . .”). 
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copyright-infringing content uploaded by individual users.16 Most 
recently in these cases, the two circuits resolved some differences in 
their interpretations of certain safe harbor provisions,17 but the 
damage has been done: these convoluted judicial interpretations of 
the safe harbors have resulted in unpredictable legal standards.18 
These legal battles have further complicated the safe harbor 
provisions by “adding extra factors and layers of analysis to the 
statutory elements,”19 creating more confusion for lower courts, 
copyright owners, ISPs, and the attorneys who must decipher these 
complex court decisions.20 
While these legal sagas have resulted in many negative 
consequences for copyright-dependent industries costly and drawn-
out litigation, forum shopping, and convoluted legal standards—
these cases also have potential positive consequences since they can 
serve as a learning tool by providing Congress with examples of 
what not to do when redrafting the safe harbor provisions.21 
Congress should examine these cases to identify and resolve the 
issues with the current safe harbor provisions to update and align the 
DMCA with technological advances. 
This Note examines the Second and Ninth Circuits’ convoluted 
judicial interpretations of the safe harbor provisions. Part II describes 
the DMCA, its safe harbor provisions, and these provisions’ 
ambiguous key terms that have been left open to complex judicial 
interpretations. Part III describes the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 
 
 16. Compare UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1042 
(9th Cir. 2011), withdrawn and superseded on rehearing by 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(requiring knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of individual items), with Viacom 
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 36 (2d Cir. 2012) (requiring only a general awareness 
that there is infringement). See generally Kim J. Landsman, Two Decisions in Battle Between Old 
and New Media Leave Little Resolved, N.Y. L.J., May 24, 2012. 
 17. UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at 1030 (“We agree with the Second Circuit and hold 
that, in order to have the ‘right and ability to control,’ the service provider must ‘exert [] 
substantial influence on the activities of users.’” (quoting Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38)). 
 18. See Eric Goldman, Viacom Loses Again—Viacom v. YouTube, TECH. & MKTG. L. 
BLOG (Apr. 19, 2013), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/04/viacom_loses_ag.htm. 
 19. Id. 
 20. UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013); Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, 
Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2103 (LLS), 2013 WL 1689071 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2013). 
 21. See Brodzinski, supra note 15, at 76 (arguing for the “need for further Congressional 
consideration of the investor liability question in the form of an amendment” to the DMCA); 
Goldman, supra note 18 (“[M]istakes with the DMCA safe harbors offer useful lessons for 
Congress’ next attempts to draft effective safe harbors.”); Pallante, supra note 15, at 329 (“On the 
one hand, [the DMCA] is our best model of future-leaning legislation. On the other hand, fifteen 
years have passed, and the world—including most notably the Internet—has evolved.”). 
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the safe harbor provisions, specifically the court’s recent rehearing 
and opinion in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners 
LLC.22 Part IV describes the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the 
DMCA, specifically the court’s recent decision in Viacom 
International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.,23 which deepened the divide 
between old and new forms of media by creating new requirements 
that ISPs must meet to qualify for safe harbor protection.24 These 
cases exemplify the DMCA safe harbors’ weaknesses, which 
Congress’s defective drafting caused.25 
Part V proposes that to remedy the problems caused by 
convoluted judicial interpretations of safe harbors under the DMCA, 
Congress must amend the safe harbor provisions. Part VI ultimately 
concludes that to facilitate the DMCA’s original goals—to allow 
new technologies to evolve and to create an environment of 
economic prosperity for both old and new media—and to avoid 
repeating the same mistakes, Congress must amend the vague 
provisions with specific definitions and provide a higher level of 
protection for ISPs. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 
A.  The Copyright Act 
The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution grants 
Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings.”26 Congress exercises this power 
by enacting laws that establish a system of copyright protection in 
the United States.27 Since Congress enacted the first federal 
copyright law in May 1790, it has aimed to strike a balance between 
securing authors’ intellectual property rights promoting the progress 
 
 22. 718 F.3d 1006. 
 23. 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Viacom Int’l, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2103 (LLS), 2013 
WL 1689071. 
 24. See Goldman, supra note 18. 
 25. See id.; see also Ryne Hodkowski, Rulings on Copyright Set Standard, DAILY JOURNAL, 
Mar. 25, 2013, at 1 (“[S]ites that let users upload content still need to be wary of a few unresolved 
issues.”). 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 27. Id.; United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html (last visited July 25, 2013). 
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of the “useful arts.”28 The term “copyright” means the body of 
exclusive legal rights granted to authors to protect their “original 
works of authorship,” which includes literary, musical, dramatic, 
pantomime, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, motion 
picture, architectural, cartographic, and audiovisual works.29 
The U.S. Copyright Act’s current version—Title 17 of the 
United States Code—was passed in 1976 and has since been 
amended more than thirty-two times as Congress has updated the law 
in an attempt to accommodate new forms of content.30 The largest 
and most drastic of those amendments was passed in 1998 and was 
titled the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.31 
B.  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
President Clinton signed the DMCA into law on October 28, 
1998.32 New technology made it possible to create digital 
embodiments of traditional forms of media owned by the copyright 
holders—books, films, and music—making them readily and cheaply 
accessible to individual users with the click of a mouse.33 The 
legislation’s purpose was to implement two 1996 World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) treaties: the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.34 In doing so, 
the bill sought to address a number of emerging copyright issues 
related to the interests of traditional copyright holders and 
technological innovators becoming increasingly intertwined.35 
The DMCA is divided into five titles.36 Title I implemented the 
WIPO treaties and added a new chapter 12 to the Copyright Act.37 
 
 28.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 30. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 12B.01[C][1] (2012); accord DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT: SACRED TEXT, TECHNOLOGY, AND 
THE DMCA 329–30 (2003). 
 31. NIMMER, supra note 30, at 329–30. 
 32. PUB. L. NO. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 
1201−1205, 1301−1332 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2006)). 
 33. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 30, § 12B.01[C][1]. 
 34. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en 
/text.jsp?file_id=295166; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), Dec. 20, 1996, 
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html. 
 35. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8–9 (1998). 
 36. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998 1 (1998) 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf. Only Titles I and II of the DMCA 
are relevant to this Note. 
 37. Id. at 2–3. 
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Within chapter 12, § 1201 provides two main protections for 
copyright holders of digital works—digital anti-circumvention 
measures and digital rights management.38 The former states that it is 
a violation of the act to manufacture or sell a product that 
circumvents a measure that is in place to control access to a protected 
work.39 The latter prohibits the unauthorized copying, downloading, 
or creating any other digital embodiment of copyrighted content.40 
Sections 1203 and 1204 add civil remedies and criminal penalties for 
violating these prohibitions.41 
1.  DMCA’s Safe Harbor Provisions for  
Internet Service Providers 
To balance the protection given to copyright holders for digital 
embodiments of their works against ISPs’ interests, Title II of the 
DMCA,42 the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation 
Act (OCILLA), limits ISPs’ liability for copyright infringement.43 
These limitations are referred to as the “safe harbor” protections and 
are included in 17 U.S.C. § 512.44 Congress did not intend for § 512 
“to imply that a service provider is or is not liable as an infringer 
either for conduct that qualifies for a limitation of liability or for 
conduct that fails to so qualify.”45 Rather, the limits on liability apply 
if the provider is found liable for copyright infringement under the 
Copyright Act’s traditional, existing principles.46 
Section 512 protects a qualifying defendant ISP from copyright 
liability for all monetary relief47 for four general categories of 
activity—forwarding, hosting, caching, and linking to copyright- 
protected content.48 To qualify for safe harbor protection, a 
 
 38. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
 39. Id. § 1201(a). 
 40. See id. § 1201(b). 
 41. Id. §§ 1203–04. 
 42. Codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 43. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c); see also Cassius Sims, A Hypothetical Non-Infringing Network: An 
Examination of the Efficacy of Safe Harbor in Section 512(c) of the DMCA, DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 9 (2009) (describing the elements of the DMCA § 512 safe harbor provisions). 
 44. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 50, 57 (1998). 
 45. Id. at 50; S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 40–41 (1998) (explaining that traditional forms of 
copyright liability include direct liability, as well as vicarious and contributory infringement). 
 46. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 50; S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 40–41. 
 47. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)−(d), (k)(2) (defining “monetary relief” as encompassing “damages, 
costs, attorneys’ fees, and any other form of monetary payment”). 
 48. See id. § 512(a)–(d), (f); NIMMER, supra note 30, at 357. 
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defendant must meet the following threshold criteria: (1) qualify as a 
“service provider” under § 512(k)(1)(B);49 (2) satisfy § 512(i)’s 
eligibility conditions;50 and (3) satisfy the specific conditions of the 
particular safe harbor under which it seeks protection.51 
One of the most commonly invoked safe harbors—and the safe 
harbor applicable to sites that feature user-generated content, such as 
YouTube—is § 512(c), which applies to infringement claims that 
arise “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material 
that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for 
the service provider.”52 Section 512(c) states that “[a] service 
provider shall not be liable for monetary relief” if it does not know of 
its users’ infringing acts.53 An ISP is also not liable under § 512(c) if 
it acts “expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material” 
when it (1) has actual knowledge; (2) is aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or (3) has 
received notification of claimed infringement meeting § 512(c)(3)’s 
requirements.54 
2.  Policies and Principles Underlying the  
Existing Statutory Safe Harbors 
While Congress intended the safe harbor provisions under 
§ 512(c) to resolve potential digital copyright suits without the 
courts’ help,55 § 512(c) has instead opened the floodgates to litigants 
disputing exactly how the safe harbor protections should be 
interpreted.56 Congress anticipated the clash between copyright 
 
 49. “[T]he term ‘service provider’ means a provider of online services or network access, or 
the operator of facilities therefor . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B). 
 50. These eligibility conditions require that an ISP adopt and implement a “repeat infringer 
policy” to warn and subsequently terminate users who repeatedly use the ISP’s site or network to 
post or share copyright-infringing content. An ISP must also inform all users of its policy. 17 
U.S.C. § 512(i); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(finding that the defendant ISP met the threshold requirement of establishing a repeat-infringer 
policy); YouTube Copyright Center, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/copyright/#yt 
-copyright-manage-content (last visited July 25, 2013) (informing YouTube users of its repeat-
infringer policy). 
 51. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 52. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). 
 53. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 54. Id. § 512(c). 
 55. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 20 (1998) (stating that the DMCA should provide “strong 
incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with 
copyright infringements”). 
 56. See Landsman, supra note 16, at 1. 
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owners and ISPs hosting copyright-protected content “[d]ue to the 
ease with which digital works can be copied and distributed 
worldwide virtually instantaneously.”57 Congress further predicted 
that without flexible and broad legislation in place “copyright owners 
w[ould] hesitate to make their works readily available on the Internet 
without reasonable assurance that they [would] be protected against 
massive piracy.”58 Thus, Congress’s primary goal in enacting the 
DMCA was to create “[l]egislation [that] provide[d] this protection 
and create[d] the legal platform for launching the global digital 
online marketplace for copyrighted works.”59 
In addition, Congress intended the act to further the hope 
represented by the new digital revolution: to “facilitate making 
available quickly and conveniently via the Internet the movies, 
music, software, and literary works that are the fruit of American 
creative genius.”60 The legislative history behind the DMCA’s 
enactment demonstrates a forward-looking Congress predicting that 
a failure to create laws addressing the potential conflict between 
owners of traditional copyright-protected works and new 
technologies would result in the stifling of technological innovation. 
But, because the Internet has evolved greatly in the fifteen years 
since the DMCA’s enactment, the time has come for Congress to 
reexamine the safe harbor provisions’ goals.61 
The constant evolution of technology demands such a 
reexamination.62 By the time a law is drafted, debated, revised, 
enacted, and goes into effect, the technology that law governs may 
well have evolved beyond that law’s scope.63 Congress therefore 
intentionally did not fully define certain requirements for safe harbor 
protection so the statute would have flexibility to evolve as 
technology evolved.64 The result has been a clash between ISPs, who 
 
 57. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Pallante, supra note 15, at 329–30. 
 62. See Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 101, 113 (2007) (arguing that the DMCA safe harbors “almost immediately became 
obsolete as new technologies . . . were developed”). 
 63. See id. 
 64. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “‘[r]ather than 
embarking on a wholesale clarification of’” copyright doctrines for the digital age, Congress 
made the decision “‘to leave current law in its evolving state and, instead, to create a series of 
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desire the most expansive safe harbor protections, and copyright 
holders, who prefer a narrower interpretation. 
Because of this clash, the central issue in recent DMCA safe 
harbor litigation has been the interpretations of two statutory phrases 
in the § 512(c) safe harbor. The first is whether the DMCA safe 
harbor, § 512(c)(1)(A), which requires “actual knowledge that the 
material or an activity using the material on the system or network is 
infringing,” and “facts or circumstances from which infringing 
activity is apparent,” means an ISP must have a general awareness 
that there is infringement, or rather, knowledge of specific and 
identifiable infringements of individual items.65 The second 
confusing interpretation is that of the specific circumstances in which 
the “right and ability to control infringing activity” would disqualify 
an ISP from safe harbor protection under § 512(c)(1)(B).66 
Judicial interpretation has not clarified these vague statutory 
sections. Instead, case law from the Second and Ninth Circuits has 
further confused lower federal district courts, lawyers attempting to 
counsel their clients in this area, and, most importantly, copyright 
holders and ISPs.67 While the Second and Ninth Circuits have 
aligned their once-conflicting interpretations of the § 512(c) safe 
harbors, this agreement resulted in complicated case law and 
lingering issues and uncertainties.68 If Congress fails to take action 
by redrafting the safe harbor provisions, these unresolved issues will 
ultimately stifle further economic and technological development for 
both ISPs and copyright holders. 
 
‘safe harbors’ for certain common activities of service providers’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19 (1998))). 
 65. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1022–23 
(9th Cir. 2013); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2012); Viacom 
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2103 (LLS), 2013 WL 1689071, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 18, 2013). 
 66. See UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at 1029–30; Viacom, 676 F.3d at 37–38 (2d Cir. 
2012); Viacom Int'l, Inc., 2013 WL 1689071, at *5–9. 
 67. See Landsman, supra note 16, at 3. 
 68. Hodkowski, supra note 25, at 2 (“[W]hile both circuit courts agree that responding 
promptly to notifications of infringing material from users or copyright owners can qualify 
websites for safe harbor [protection], other problems can still arise.”). 
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III.  THE NINTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETATION: 
PROVIDING BROAD SAFE HARBOR PROTECTION TO ISPS 
The Ninth Circuit has consistently interpreted the safe harbor 
elements broadly, giving expansive protection to ISPs.69 Much of the 
early case law interpreting the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions 
comes from this circuit.70 
A.  A History of Broad Protection for the 
Local Technology Industries 
Shortly after the DMCA’s enactment, the Ninth Circuit had the 
first opportunity to address the safe harbor provisions’ scope in the 
2001 case A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.71 There, the Ninth 
Circuit held that an ISP will be liable for contributory copyright 
infringement72 only when it learns of specific infringing content 
available on its site but fails to remove that content.73 The court also 
held that Congress intended the DMCA safe harbors to protect ISPs 
from liability for both direct74 and contributory copyright 
infringement.75 
In A&M Records, defendant Napster created and operated a 
popular peer-to-peer file sharing website whose users could 
 
 69. See Kravets, supra note 10. 
 70. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“[A]bsent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a computer system 
operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system 
allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.”). 
 71. Id. at 1004. 
 72. Secondary copyright infringement imposes liability on a third party for acts of direct 
infringement committed by others. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 30, § 12.04. There are “three 
strands” of secondary liability: vicarious liability, contributory infringement, and inducement. Id. 
§ 12.04[A][1]. “Vicarious liability exists when two elements are present. First, the defendant 
must possess the right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct. Second that defendant must 
have ‘an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials.’” Id. 
§ 12.04[A][2]. “Contributory infringement requires that the defendant is either a participant in the 
infringement or contributes machinery or goods that provide the means to infringe.” Id. 
§ 12.04[A][3][a]. Inducement liability is based on the defendant’s “active steps to encourage 
infringement” leading to actual infringement taking place. Id. (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 922 (2005)).  
 73. A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1027. 
 74. Direct copyright infringement occurs when the defendant copies elements of an original 
work and the plaintiff owns a valid copyright in that work. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 
30, § 13.01. A defendant may also be held liable for contributory infringement if the defendant 
did not directly infringe but provided the direct infringer with the machinery or goods that 
provide the means to commit direct infringement. Id. § 12.04[A][3][a]. 
 75. A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1025. 
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download Napster’s “MusicShare” software for free.76 MusicShare 
allowed any individual user with an Internet connection both to 
upload MP3 music files77 from her personal computer’s hard drive to 
Napster’s website and to search for and download MP3 files stored 
on other users’ hard drives.78 Various music industry plaintiffs 
including A&M Records, Geffen Records, Interscope, and Sony 
Music Entertainment, argued that Napster’s software and website 
facilitated the free and potentially unlimited copying of copyright-
protected digital music files—music content owned by the 
plaintiffs.79 The plaintiffs successfully proved to the district court 
that 87 percent of the music files available on Napster were 
copyrighted and that the plaintiffs owned 70 percent of this music.80 
The plaintiffs argued that Napster’s users were guilty of direct 
copyright infringement, thus making Napster guilty of contributory 
infringement because it “knowingly encourage[d] and assist[ed] the 
infringement of plaintiffs’ copyrights.”81 While the Ninth Circuit 
agreed with the district court’s holding that there was sufficient 
evidence supporting Napster’s liability for contributory and vicarious 
infringement, it disagreed with the lower court’s refusal to apply the 
safe harbor protections to Napster.82 The Ninth Circuit went on to 
hold that the district court erroneously concluded that § 512 does not 
apply to contributory infringers. Thus, the Ninth Circuit determined 
that the district court erred in rejecting Napster’s defense to the 
contributory infringement claim.83 The Ninth Circuit further held that 
Congress intended the safe harbors to protect ISPs from claims of 
contributory and vicarious liability based on actual infringement by 
their individual users.84 
 
 76. Id. at 1011. 
 77. The abbreviation MP3 stands for MPEG-3, which is the “standard [digital] file format 
for the storage of audio” files. Id. at 1011. MP3 files were originally created through a process 
called “ripping,” in which a user would use computer software to copy a compact disc (CD) “onto 
a computer hard drive by compressing the audio” data from the CD to the MP3 format. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1004, 1012–13. 
 80. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 911 (N.D. Cal. 2000), rev’d, 
239 F.3d 1004. 
 81. A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1020. 
 82. Id. at 1025. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.; see also Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control: Reading Vicarious 
Liability for Copyright Infringement into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 75 
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A&M Records marks the beginning of the Ninth Circuit’s 
tendency to read the safe harbor provisions in a way that favors ISPs. 
The court used this case as an opportunity to correct what is 
perceived as the district court’s error by explicitly noting that 
Congress intended the DMCA safe harbors to protect ISPs against 
liability for both contributory and direct copyright infringement.85 
Without the safe harbor protections, Napster would likely have been 
found liable for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement86 
since Napster created its website and software to allow users to make 
copies and transfer copyrighted music for free.87 In fact, Napster did 
not even contest on appeal the district court’s holding that the 
plaintiffs successfully presented a prima facie case of direct 
infringement by Napster’s users.88 
Six years later, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC,89 the Ninth 
Circuit refused to shift from the copyright holder to the ISP the 
burden of investigating potentially infringing content.90 There, 
plaintiff Perfect 10 published an adult entertainment magazine and 
website whose users had to pay a subscription fee to access the 
website’s images.91 Perfect 10 was the registered copyright holder 
for the nearly 5,000 images displayed on its website.92 Defendant 
CWIE was an ISP providing both an Internet connection and 
webhosting services to its website-owner clients.93 A second 
defendant, CCBill, allowed individual consumers to pay the 
subscription or access fees to websites via credit card or check 
payment.94 
Perfect 10 alleged that CWIE and CCBill infringed Perfect 10’s 
copyrights by knowingly providing Internet hosting services to 
clients who posted images taken from Perfect 10’s magazine and 
Perfect10.com on their own websites, allowing users to access the 
 
WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1028–31 (2000) (“[T]he committee reports leave no doubt that Congress 
intended to provide some relief from vicarious liability.”). 
 85. A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1025. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. at 1011–12. 
 88. Id. at 1013. 
 89. 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 90. Id. at 1113. 
 91. Id. at 1108. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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photos without paying the subscription fee required by 
Perfect10.com.95 Perfect 10 further alleged that the defendants did 
not qualify for protection from liability under the DMCA’s safe 
harbors because they failed to “reasonably implement” a policy to 
deal with users who were repeat infringers.96 
To qualify for safe harbor protection, an ISP must meet the 
threshold requirement stated in § 512(i) by adopting and reasonably 
implementing a policy to notify and terminate individual users who 
are repeat copyright infringers.97 Although the statute does not define 
“reasonably implemented,” the court held that an ISP implements a 
policy if it “has a working notification system, a procedure for 
dealing with DMCA-complaint notifications, and if it does not 
actively prevent copyright owners from collecting information 
needed to issue such notifications.”98 The court also held that the 
defendants reasonably implemented repeat-infringer policies by 
maintaining “DMCA logs” to record each time one of their website-
owner clients committed an infringing act and effectively terminated 
those clients who continued to infringe even after being warned.99 
The court also addressed the level of knowledge of user 
infringement an ISP must possess to “reasonably implement” a 
repeat-infringer policy that meets § 512(i)’s requirements.100 The 
court held that to effectively identify and terminate repeat infringers, 
an ISP “need not affirmatively police its users for evidence of repeat 
infringement.”101 If an ISP were required to terminate users when the 
ISP possessed only a general awareness of infringing activity, rather 
than actual knowledge or awareness, “§ 512(c)’s grant of immunity 
would be meaningless.”102 The court’s interpretation of the safe 
harbor is supported by legislative history, which states that § 512(h) 
is not intended to “undermine the . . . knowledge standard of new 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1109−10. 
 97. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2006); Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1109 (stating that an ISP meets 
the threshold requirement of establishing a repeat-infringer policy when it “[h]as adopted and 
reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s 
system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of 
subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network who are repeat 
infringers” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2006))). 
 98. Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1109. 
 99. Id. at 1110–11. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1111. 
 102. Id. 
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subsection (c).”103 Perfect 10 alleged that the defendants maintained 
unreasonable repeat-infringer policies that turned a blind eye to their 
users’ “red flag” copyright infringement, and then ignored Perfect 
10’s notices of the infringement.104 
The court rejected Perfect 10’s argument, reasoning that “[t]he 
DMCA notification procedures place the burden of policing 
copyright infringement—identifying the potentially infringing 
material and adequately documenting infringement—squarely on the 
owners of the copyright. We decline to shift a substantial burden 
from the copyright owner to the provider.”105 Therefore, because it 
appeared that Perfect 10 had failed to provide the defendants with 
knowledge or awareness within § 512(c)(1)(A)’s standard, the court 
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether CWIE 
met § 512(i)’s threshold requirements.106 If CWIE did not have 
knowledge of their users’ infringing activity, it would be entitled to 
safe harbor under § 512(c).107 As to CCBill, the court remanded to 
the district court for further consideration on the issue of whether 
CCBill’s online activity of transmitting credit card information was 
enough for it to qualify as a service provider under § 512(a).108 
Perfect 10 also argued that CWIE was liable for contributory 
copyright infringement because it had hosted “password-hacking 
websites,”109 which provide users with passwords that allow illegal 
access to copyrighted material.110 Perfect 10 argued that hosting such 
websites should have served as a “red flag” of copyright 
infringement to CWIE.111 The court rejected this argument and held 
that for a website’s activity to qualify as a “red flag” of infringement 
to the ISP, it must “be apparent that the website instructed or enabled 
users to infringe another’s copyright.”112 Further, the court stated that 
the burden is not on the ISP to determine whether the illegal 
passwords available on a website enabled user infringement because 
“[t]here is simply no way for a service provider to conclude that the 
 
 103. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 61 (1998). 
 104. Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1110−11. 
 105. Id. at 1113. 
 106. Id. at 1117−18. 
 107. Id. 
 108 Id. at 1116. 
 109. Id. at 1114. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
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passwords enabled infringement without trying the passwords, and 
verifying that they enabled illegal access to copyrighted material.”113 
The Ninth Circuit refused to impose such investigative duties on 
ISPs.114 
B.  The Current State of the Law in the Ninth Circuit 
In a high-profile December 2011 decision, the Ninth Circuit 
reaffirmed that the “right and ability to control under § 512(c) 
requires control over specific infringing activity the provider knows 
about.”115 In March 2013, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its December 
2011 opinion and filed a superseding opinion in an effort to align its 
interpretation of the safe harbor provisions with the Second Circuit’s 
more complex interpretation.116 While the later opinion reaffirmed 
the Ninth Circuit’s broad interpretation of the safe harbors, it left 
other issues unresolved and vulnerable to further confusion for 
potential litigants and lower courts.117 
In UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC,118 
plaintiff Universal Music Group (UMG), one of the world’s largest 
record companies and the copyright owner of volumes of popular 
music, sued Veoh Networks (“Veoh”) for direct, vicarious, and 
contributory copyright infringement, as well as for inducement of 
infringement.119 Veoh operated a website with a concept similar to 
YouTube—a publicly accessible site that allowed users to create a 
profile to upload and share music videos with other users.120 Veoh 
attempted to preempt copyright infringement by sending warning 
messages to users and by using software that automatically identified 
and disabled infringing content.121 Despite Veoh’s efforts, however, 
some of its users could still download videos containing songs for 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1043 (9th Cir. 
2011), overruled by 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 116. UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at 1020; see also infra Part IV.A−B (outlining the 
Second Circuit’s interpretation of the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions). 
 117. See Goldman, supra note 18; Hodkowski, supra note 25. 
 118. 718 F.3d 1006. 
 119. Id. at 1013. 
 120. Id. at 1011–12. 
 121. Id. at 1012 (“Each time a user begins to upload a video to Veoh’s website, a message 
appears stating, ‘Do not upload videos that infringe copyright, are pornographic, obscene, violent, 
or any other videos that violate Veoh’s Terms of Use.’”). 
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which UMG owned the copyrights.122 The district court held that 
Veoh met all of the § 512(c) safe harbor requirements and therefore 
granted Veoh’s motion for summary judgment.123 
On appeal, UMG claimed that Veoh had “receive[d] a financial 
benefit” from its users’ infringement124 and did not qualify for safe 
harbor protection because it did not meet three statutory 
requirements.125 UMG argued that the threshold requirement of 
“infringement of copyright by reason of the storage . . . at the 
direction of a user” must be interpreted narrowly, and, therefore, 
Veoh’s site did not fall within this category because “[f]acilitation of 
access [to user uploaded videos] . . . goes beyond ‘storage.’”126 
Second, UMG argued that Veoh had had actual knowledge of 
infringing content but had failed to take adequate steps to remove 
this content.127 Finally, UMG argued that Veoh had received “a 
financial benefit ‘directly attributable to . . . infringing activity that it 
had the right and ability to control under Section 512(c)(1)(B)’”128 
because Veoh had had “the ability to locate infringing material and 
terminate users’ access.”129 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with UMG’s 
arguments and affirmed the district court’s ruling.130 
In addressing each of UMG’s arguments, the court offered its 
own definition of the contested safe harbor requirements.131 The 
court held that the threshold requirement of a qualifying ISP is 
statutorily broader than the narrow definition of “web host” 
suggested by UMG, and includes activities that go beyond storage.132 
As to the knowledge requirement, the court held that “merely hosting 
a category of copyrightable content . . . with the general knowledge 
that one’s services could be used to share infringing material, is 
 
 122. Id. at 1013. 
 123. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 
2009), aff’d in part and remanded in part by UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners 
LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1042 (9th Cir. 2011), withdrawn and superseded on rehearing by 718 F.3d 
1006 (9th Cir. 2013) 
 124. UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at 1015 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1016. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1015. 
 129. Id. at 1027. 
 130. Id. at 1015. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1019–20. 
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insufficient to meet the actual knowledge requirement under 
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(i).”133 
Finally, the court explicitly agreed with the Second Circuit and 
held that “in order to have the ‘right and ability to control,’ [under 
§ 512(c)] the service provider must ‘exert [ ] substantial influence on 
the activities of users.’”134 Further, the court explained that 
“‘[s]ubstantial influence’ may include, as the Second Circuit 
suggested, high levels of control over activities of users . . . [o]r it 
may include purposeful conduct.”135 Finally, the court examined 
Veoh’s conduct under this standard and concluded that Veoh’s 
interactions with its users did not reach that high level of control.136 
The court’s decision was a victory for ISPs, allowing them to 
focus on creating new technology since the Ninth Circuit explicitly 
reaffirmed its view that the burden of investigating digital copyright 
infringement must remain on the copyright owner.137 The court noted 
that UMG’s decision to forgo the DMCA notice protocol, on grounds 
that Veoh must have known of the apparent infringing content on its 
site, “stripped it of the most powerful evidence of a service 
provider’s knowledge—actual knowledge of infringement from the 
copyright holder.”138 The court emphasized that  
[i]f merely hosting material that falls within a category of 
content capable of copyright protection, with the general 
knowledge that one’s services could be used to share 
unauthorized copies of copyrighted material, was sufficient 
to impute knowledge to service providers, the § 512(c) safe 
harbor would be rendered a dead letter.139  
Further, the court noted that “[a]lthough the parties agree, in 
retrospect, that at times there was infringing material available on 
Veoh’s services, the DMCA recognizes that service providers who 
do not locate and remove infringing materials they do not 
specifically know of should not suffer the loss of safe harbor 
 
 133. Id. at 1022. 
 134. Id. at 1030 (quoting Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 38 (2d Cir. 
2012)); see also infra Part IV.B. 
 135. UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at 1030 (quoting Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38). 
 136. Id. at 1030–31. 
 137. See UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at 1023. 
 138. Id. at 1020 (quoting Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1107 
(W.D. Wash. 2004)). 
 139. Id. at 1021. 
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protection.”140 The court also gave great deference to the legislative 
purpose underlying the safe harbors by emphasizing that “[a]lthough 
Congress was aware that the services provided by companies like 
Veoh are capable of being misused to facilitate copyright 
infringement, it was loath to permit the specter of liability to chill 
innovation that could also serve substantial socially beneficial 
functions.”141 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision has effectively given ISPs—a 
significant number of which are in the Silicon Valley—the freedom 
to innovate, because the responsibility for monitoring user-uploaded, 
copyright-infringing content is on the copyright holder. But while the 
safe harbors ultimately protect ISPs from liability, they do not 
protect ISPs from being sued by media-giant copyright holders. For 
example, Veoh may have won the court battle, but it lost the “overall 
war” because it was forced to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
protection in 2010 due, in part, to the enormous cost of defending 
itself against UMG.142 Forcing ISPs into bankruptcy in such 
circumstances does not comport with Congress’s intent that the 
DMCA provide “strong incentives for service providers and 
copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright 
infringements.”143 Finally, the Ninth Circuit did not adequately 
address the issue of whether ISPs may qualify for safe harbor 
protection if they incite users to store copyright-infringing 
materials.144 Therefore, this storage issue will likely become yet 
another area of contentious litigation in the future. 
IV.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT INTERPRETATION: A STATE OF CONFUSION 
FOLLOWING VIACOM V. YOUTUBE 
While the Ninth Circuit was protecting ISPs’ ability to innovate, 
on the other side of the country the Second Circuit was narrowing the 
safe harbor protections in favor of traditional media industries. In 
2007, Viacom and various other copyright holders—including 
Paramount Pictures, Country Music Television, and Black 
 
 140. Id. at 1023. 
 141. Id. at 1014. 
 142. Hodkowski, supra note 25, at 2 (“The DMCA is supposed to make it safe for online 
service providers, and it's not safe if they can still be subject to excessive litigation.”). 
 143. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 40 (1998). 
 144. See UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at 1019 (noting only that Congress intended the 
DMCA’s safe harbors to shield not only ISPs that host sites but those that store content as well). 
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Entertainment Television—sued YouTube for direct and secondary 
copyright infringement seeking damages of nearly one billion 
dollars.145 The plaintiffs sought to hold YouTube liable for violations 
by individual users who had uploaded thousands of videos 
containing copyright-protected content to YouTube’s site.146 In 2010, 
a federal district court in Manhattan granted summary judgment for 
the defendant, holding that YouTube qualified for safe harbor 
protection.147 
A.  The Second Circuit’s Interpretation of Section 512(c)(1)(A): 
Reading Willful Blindness into the Specific Knowledge or 
Awareness Requirement 
In April 2012, the Second Circuit partially reversed the lower 
court’s ruling, holding that the district court’s interpretation of the 
safe harbor provisions was incorrect. The circuit court remanded the 
case for fact-finding, asking the district court to determine whether 
YouTube qualified for safe harbor protection.148 The Second Circuit 
agreed with the district court—and the Ninth Circuit’s view149—that 
an ISP is not disqualified from safe harbor protection merely because 
it possesses general knowledge that its users have uploaded 
infringing content.150 But, the court went on to hold that although the 
district court had correctly interpreted § 512(c)(1)(A), granting 
summary judgment for YouTube was inappropriate because a 
reasonable juror could conclude that YouTube had had actual 
knowledge of specific instances of infringement, which it had failed 
to remove.151 
The court based its holding on evidence presented by Viacom, 
including evidence that YouTube employees conducted surveys and 
found that 75 to 80 percent of the site’s videos contained copyrighted 
 
 145. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part by 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Steven Seidenberg, Viacom v. YouTube 
Raises Copyright Infringement Questions, INSIDE COUNSEL July, 2012, available at 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/07/01/viacom-v-youtube-raises-copyright-infringement 
-que#.UPDMA4FJrTw.email (providing an overview of Viacom’s lawsuit and an explanation of 
the subsequent holdings). 
 146. Viacom, 676 F.3d 19. 
 147. Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 
 148. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 41–42. 
 149. See supra Part III. 
 150. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 41–42. 
 151. Id. at 33–34. 
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content.152 Even more damaging was a 2006 report in which one of 
YouTube’s founders listed popular television programs that had been 
posted on the site and not removed.153 The report further stated that 
“although YouTube is not legally required to monitor content . . . and 
complies with DMCA takedown requests, we would benefit from 
preemptively removing content that is blatantly illegal and likely to 
attract criticism.”154 The plaintiffs also presented a series of email 
exchanges among the three YouTube cofounders, in which the three 
acknowledged the need to be diligent in removing copyrighted 
content. In reference to a video clip originally shown on CNN, one 
email stated: “[W]e can remove it once we’re bigger and better 
known, but for now that clip is fine.”155 Taken together, this evidence 
confirmed YouTube’s knowledge of specific copyright-infringing 
content on its site, defeating its safe harbor defense.156 
The Second Circuit’s opinion further complicated DMCA 
interpretation by addressing an issue “of first impression”157 that the 
plaintiffs had raised: whether the common law willful-blindness 
doctrine applies in the context of the DMCA’s safe harbor 
provisions.158 The plaintiffs argued that the district court had erred in 
dismissing the case because the plaintiffs had presented clear 
evidence that YouTube was “willfully blind” to specific infringing 
activity, which amounted to knowledge or awareness of infringement 
under § 512(c)(1)(A).159 Second Circuit precedent has held that 
defendants in patent or trademark infringement cases are willfully 
blind, and deemed to have knowledge of infringement, “where the 
person was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and 
consciously avoided confirming that fact.”160 On the other hand, the 
court stated that “willful blindness cannot be defined as an 
affirmative duty to monitor”—the concept lies somewhere in the 
middle.161 The court noted that although the “principle that willful 
 
 152. Id. at 33. 
 153. Id. (noting that some of the television shows listed in the report are owned by Viacom, 
including The Daily Show). 
 154. Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 155. Id. at 34. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 34−35. 
 160. Id. at 35 (quoting United States v. Aina-Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 161. Id. (citing Aina-Marshall, 336 F.3d at 170).  
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blindness is tantamount to knowledge is hardly novel,” the DMCA 
makes no mention of willful blindness.162 Nevertheless, the court 
determined that this statutory silence did not, by itself, abrogate the 
willful blindness doctrine.163 Therefore, the court held that “the 
willful blindness doctrine may be applied, in appropriate 
circumstances, to demonstrate knowledge or awareness of specific 
instances of infringement under the DMCA.”164 Notably, the court 
did not specify when these “appropriate circumstances” might arise 
and instead remanded the issue to the lower court to decide whether 
YouTube willfully had blinded itself to infringement to an extent that 
would constitute knowledge.165 
B.  The Second Circuit’s Interpretation of § 512(c)(1)(B): The 
Knowledge Requirement of the “Control and Benefit Provision” 
In the next portion of the opinion, the Second Circuit disagreed 
with the Ninth Circuit’s initial interpretation of § 512(c)(1)(B), the 
safe harbor provision, stating that an eligible ISP must “not receive a 
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a 
case in which the [ISP] has the right and ability to control such 
activity.”166 Originally, before the Ninth Circuit reheard and reissued 
its opinion in UMG Recordings, the court had held that “until the 
[ISP] becomes aware of specific unauthorized material, it cannot 
exercise its ‘power or authority’ over the specific infringing item.”167 
The Second Circuit disagreed with this interpretation, calling it 
“fatally flawed,”168 because that construction seemingly imported a 
specific knowledge requirement into § 512(c)(1)(B), rendering it 
identical to the safe harbor provision in § 512(c)(1)(A) and, 
therefore, redundant.169 The Second Circuit went on to state that if 
the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation were followed, “no additional 
 
 162. Id. at 34–35 (quoting Tiffany, Inc., v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 110 n.16 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
 163. Id. at 35. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 36 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2012)). 
 167. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC , 667 F.3d 1022, 1042 (9th Cir. 
2011) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 3, 4 (2002)), overruled by 
718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 168. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36. 
 169. Id. 
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service provider would be excluded by Section 512(c)(1)(B) that was 
not already excluded by Section 512(c)(1)(A).”170 
Instead, the Second Circuit held that § 512(c)(1)(B) did not 
include a specific-knowledge requirement because having the “right 
and ability to control” infringing activity “requires something more 
than the ability to remove or block access to materials posted on a[n 
ISP’s] website.”171 This means that an ISP may be disqualified from 
safe harbor protection under § 512(c)(1)(B) even if it lacks item-
specific knowledge of user infringement.172 The court went on to 
note that the “remaining—and more difficult—question is how to 
define the ‘something more’ that is required.”173 Unfortunately, the 
Second Circuit left this question unanswered, instead remanding the 
case to the district court to consider whether a reasonable juror could 
conclude that YouTube had the requisite right and ability to control 
its users’ infringing activity, which would disqualify YouTube from 
safe harbor protection.174 
Although the Second Circuit was ultimately likely correct that 
the Ninth Circuit’s 2011 interpretation would have made 
§ 512(c)(1)(B) into essentially a duplicate of § 512(c)(1)(A), the 
Second Circuit’s “solution” leaves the parameters of the safe harbor 
even less clear than before. It takes the easily understood Ninth 
Circuit interpretation and replaces it with “something more”—which 
has yet to be defined—further complicating the § 512(c) legal 
standard. As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit compounded the 
confusion when it superseded this earlier, clearer interpretation and 
brought its view more in line with that of the Second Circuit. 
C.  Remand to the District Court 
On remand, the Southern District of New York once again 
granted summary judgment in YouTube’s favor.175 Judge Louis L. 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 38 (quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 645 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. (quoting Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 645). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2103 (LLS), 2013 WL 1689071, at *11 
(S.D.N.Y Apr. 18, 2013); see also Pio Szamel, District Court Grants Summary Judgment to 
YouTube in Viacom v. YouTube (Again), HARV. J.L. & TECH. JOLT DIGEST 1 (May 2, 2013), 
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/copyright/district-court-grants-summary-judgment-to-youtube 
-in-viacom-v-youtube-again. 
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Stanton, who originally presided over the case in 2010, now 
attempted to clarify his ruling in light of the Second Circuit’s opinion 
and end the litigation once and for all.176 The judge requested that 
both parties report “what precise information was given to or 
reasonably apparent to YouTube identifying the location or site of 
the infringing matter.”177 In response, “YouTube submitted a list of 
63,060 clips-in-suit [and] claimed it never received adequate notices 
of any of those infringements.”178 Viacom then made the damaging 
admission in its opposition brief that “[i]t has now become clear that 
neither side possesses the kind of evidence that would allow a clip-
by-clip assessment of actual knowledge” and that “Viacom has failed 
to come forward with evidence establishing YouTube’s knowledge 
of specific clips-in-suit.”179 The court held that “the burden of 
showing that YouTube knew or was aware of the specific 
infringements of the works in suit cannot be shifted to YouTube to 
disprove” because that would defeat the safe harbors’ purpose.180 
Therefore, because Viacom lacked proof that YouTube had 
knowledge or awareness of any specific infringements, summary 
judgment in YouTube’s favor on this issue was proper.181 
The court then tried to untangle the mess the Second Circuit had 
made of the willful blindness issue.182 Citing to the Second Circuit 
opinion, the court added that “[u]nder § 512(m), nothing in the 
applicable section of the DMCA shall be construed to require 
YouTube’s affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing 
activity.”183 Therefore, the court held that YouTube had not 
maintained willful blindness to users’ specific infringements.184 
Finally, as to the issue of YouTube’s right and ability to control 
infringements, the court rearticulated the Second Circuit’s legal 
standard that having “knowledge of the prevalence of infringing 
activity, and welcoming it, does not itself forfeit the safe harbor. To 
forfeit that, the provider must influence or participate in the 
 
 176. See Goldman, supra note 18, at 13. 
 177. Viacom Int’l Inc., 2013 WL 1689071, at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at *3. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at *3–4. 
 183. Id. at *5. 
 184. Id. 
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infringement.”185 The court did not elaborate on the vague meanings 
of “influence” or “participate” but went on to conclude: 
There is no evidence that YouTube induced its users to 
submit infringing videos, provided users with detailed 
instructions about what content to upload or edited their 
content, prescreened submissions for quality, steered users 
to infringing videos, or otherwise interacted with infringing 
users to a point where it might be said to have participated 
in their infringing activity.186 
While the district court ruled for YouTube on every issue, this 
seemingly never-ending legal saga continues. On July 26, 2013, 
Viacom once again appealed the district court’s ruling, further 
perpetuating an already expensive and drawn-out legal battle.187 
In summary, Viacom increased the DMCA confusion by adding 
a “willful blindness” caveat to its interpretation of § 512(c)(1)(A), 
and by interpreting § 512(c)(1)(B) as not requiring item-specific 
knowledge of infringement for a party to have the right and ability to 
control users’ infringing activity.188 Further, the court failed to 
specify when an ISP possesses the level of willful blindness of 
infringement—or the “something more” required to have the right 
and ability to control infringement—that will disqualify the ISP from 
safe harbor protection.189 While this particular legal battle was 
temporarily resolved on remand, the district court’s most recent 
opinion did little to clarify the § 512 legal standard. 
The Second Circuit’s unclear interpretation of the safe harbors 
in Viacom demonstrates the problems that have resulted from 
Congress’s vague safe harbor provisions. Although the Second and 
Ninth Circuits have aligned their interpretations of some safe harbor 
provisions, confusion remains. Congress must remedy this confusion 
with an amendment to the safe harbor provisions. 
 
 185. Id. at *6. 
 186. Id. at *9. 
 187. See Eriq Gardner, Viacom Demands New Judge in YouTube Copyright Fight, 
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (July 30, 2013, 7:56 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr 
-esq/viacom-demands-new-judge-youtube-595471 (“[The Second Circuit] is primed to review the 
long-running dispute a second time.”). 
 188. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 41–42 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 189. Id. at 38. 
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V.  PROPOSAL: A LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT TO THE SAFE HARBOR 
PROVISIONS IS NEEDED TO REMEDY THE PROBLEMS EXEMPLIFIED IN 
CONVOLUTED CASE LAW 
Since the DMCA was enacted in 1998, the two circuit courts 
that are most influential on the cultures of media and technology 
have failed to clearly define the safe harbor provisions’ vague 
elements.190 This has occurred in part because Congress intentionally 
left key safe harbor provisions undefined to allow innovative 
technologies to evolve without the ominous threat of liability for 
copyright infringement.191 This ambiguity has, however, resulted not 
in the malleable and consistent development of jurisprudence but in 
massive amounts of expensive and high-profile litigation in already 
congested federal courts over statutory elements’ meanings.192 
Furthermore, judicial interpretations of the policy behind the safe 
harbor provisions differ depending on the court’s jurisdiction and the 
parties involved.193 The confusion created by the Second and Ninth 
Circuits’ interpretations of these DMCA provisions is representative 
of the larger issue of the battle between old and new media—the 
traditional forms of copyright-protected materials versus their digital 
alter egos, and the East Coast publishers’ and media giants’ 
resistance to the changing landscape of digital innovation in the West 
Coast’s Silicon Valley.194 
 
 190. See id. at 36; UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
 191. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “[r]ather than 
embarking on a wholesale clarification” of copyright doctrines for the digital age, Congress made 
the decision to “leave current law in its evolving state and, instead, to create a series of ‘safe 
harbors’ for certain common activities of service providers” (quoting SEN. REP. NO. 105-190, at 
19 (1998))). 
 192. See Hodkowski, supra note 25, at 2 (“Crippling litigation fees remains a major issue for 
service providers—a situation where they can win a court battle but lose the overall war.”); 
Seidenberg, supra note 145, at 1 (detailing courts’ interpretations of the safe harbor clause and the 
substantial resources and litigation involved). 
 193. See Landsman, supra note 16, at 2−3 (describing the Second and Ninth Circuits’ 
different approaches and the parties involved). 
 194. See Brian Day, In Defense of Copyright: Record Labels, Creativity, and the Future of 
Music, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 61, 76. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals is 
located on the East Coast, primarily encompassing New York, original home to the traditional 
media conglomerates—publishing companies, record labels, and television networks. Second 
Circuit, WASHLAW WEB, http://www.washlaw.edu/uslaw/circuits/2ndCircuit/index.html (last 
visited July 25, 2013); see Robert W. Hamilton, Liability for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 
8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 733, 733 (1998). 
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A.  A Call to Congress:  
Proposed Amendment to the DMCA Safe Harbors 
The Second and Ninth Circuits’ convoluted interpretations of the 
DMCA safe harbor provisions represent a larger legal and 
ideological battle: traditional forms of media are resistant to adapting 
to keep pace with new technological advancements. Following the 
state of confusion in the wake of Viacom and UMG Recordings, 
finding safe harbor clarification through lower court decisions seems 
nearly impossible. The safe harbor provisions can now be clarified in 
only two ways: a judicial resolution by the Supreme Court or a 
legislative amendment to the DMCA. While a judicial ruling may 
temporarily clarify the safe harbor provisions, it is ultimately 
Congress’s responsibility to enact and amend copyright 
legislation.195 Therefore, amending the DMCA to clearly define the 
roles and responsibilities of ISPs and copyright holders in response 
to user-uploaded infringing material is the best solution to achieving 
the proper balance between old and new media. 
Indeed, Maria Pallante, the Register of Copyrights and Director 
of the Copyright Office, has advocated for “comprehensive review 
and revision of U.S. copyright law” in its entirety, including the 
DMCA.196 Congress has not amended the DMCA since the statute’s 
inception in 1998.197 Because the world of technology and the 
Internet have greatly evolved in the last sixteen years,198 the entire 
DMCA is due for a facelift.199 
To remedy the confusion created by circuit court case law, 
Congress should redraft the safe harbor provisions to clearly define 
the limits of ISP protections. Because of Congress’s clear intent that 
the safe harbors be construed broadly to provide a high level of 
protection for potentially infringing ISPs,200 the amendment should 
minimize and streamline the list of formalities that ISPs must meet to 
be granted safe harbor protection. This will allow innovators—both 
 
 195. The Copyright Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the power to promote the 
“useful [a]rts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 196. Pallante, supra note 15, at 315, 329. 
 197. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 30, § TL (laying out a timeline of significant 
events in the history of U.S. copyright law, including all amendments, revisions, and updates to 
the Copyright Act). 
 198. See Lemley, supra note 62, at 113; Pallante, supra note 15, at 329. 
 199. Pallante, supra note 15, at 329. 
 200. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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the inexperienced and the largest technology companies—the 
freedom to focus on developing new products, free from the fear of 
being sued for copyright infringement. Providing ISPs with a 
minimal set of requirements to invoke safe harbor protection will 
ensure that only ISPs that actively encourage users to post infringing 
content will lose protection. This will effectuate the central goal 
behind the DMCA’s enactment, which is to “facilitate the robust 
development and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, 
communications, research, development, and education in the digital 
age.”201 Congress must also specifically define key terms within the 
safe harbors to avoid lower courts’ confusion caused by the current 
broad and vague safe harbor provisions.202 Finally, Congress must 
update the DMCA to foster the twenty-first century’s technology-
centered culture by clearly stating that the burden of policing 
copyright infringement must remain with copyright owners rather 
than shifted to ISPs. 
Because the knowledge provision of § 512(c)(1)(A) does not 
mention willful blindness, the Second Circuit’s willful blindness 
doctrine should not be applied to the safe harbor provisions as a way 
to demonstrate an ISP’s knowledge of specific infringement 
instances. Further, Congress should replace § 512(c)(1)(B)’s vague 
“right and ability to control” language with specific language stating 
that an ISP will not qualify for safe harbor protection if it has 
knowledge of and control over specific infringing activity. This level 
of “control” must also be defined to encompass specific activities, 
such as an ISP’s encouraging users to upload infringing content.203 
A legislative amendment that provides specific, bright-line 
requirements that ISPs must meet to qualify for safe harbor 
protection is necessary for three reasons: (1) to avoid repeating the 
same mistakes created by Congress’s defective and vague drafting of 
the 1998 safe harbors, which resulted in confusing judge-made 
standards; (2) to economically benefit both copyright holders and 
ISPs; and (3) to ensure that the United States remains a competitor in 
the global technology industries. 
 
 201. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1–2 (1998). 
 202. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 30, § 12A.17[B]. 
 203. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1030 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
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1.  Bright-Line Rules Prevent Case Law Confusion 
First, an amendment to the safe harbor provisions that contains 
clear, bright-line rules is necessary to avoid the confusion created by 
the vague legal standards of the original safe harbors. In 1998, 
Congress intentionally drafted vague safe harbor provisions—leaving 
them open to judicial interpretation—to provide broad and flexible 
protection for qualifying ISPs.204 Congress knew that ISPs would be 
placed in the difficult position of providing online services to users 
that might raise the danger of copyright infringement.205 Congress 
decided that including safe harbor protections in the DMCA, limiting 
ISPs’ liability, would “ensure[] that the efficiency of the Internet 
w[ould] continue to improve and that the variety and quality of 
services on the Internet w[ould] continue to expand.”206 While these 
goals are still relevant, the technological landscape has evolved since 
1998, particularly in the area of user-generated content sites. 
The amended safe harbors must therefore be accessible to 
technological innovators and the general public, who may be 
deterred from creating or using new technology for fear of copyright 
infringement liability. The general public must be capable of easily 
understanding DMCA safe harbors because new technologies 
continue to make traditional forms of media—books, music, art, and 
motion pictures—readily and inexpensively available to the public at 
the click of a mouse.207 Indeed, user-generated content sites such as 
YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter encourage innovation by allowing 
individuals to upload and share their own innovations with the 
world.208 
2.  Economic Benefits 
Second, a clearly defined legislative amendment to the safe 
harbors will benefit both copyright holders and ISPs, reducing 
expensive litigation by parties arguing over the correct interpretation 
 
 204. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Section 
512(a) [of the DMCA] provides a broad grant of immunity to service providers whose connection 
with the material is transient.”). 
 205. See UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at 1014 (“Although Congress was aware that the 
services provided by companies like Veoh are capable of being misused to facilitate copyright 
infringement, it was loath to permit the specter of liability to chill innovation that could also serve 
substantial socially beneficial functions.”). 
 206. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See id. 
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of vague statutory provisions.209 In Viacom, twenty-seven lawyers 
appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs and twenty-five groups filed 
amicus briefs in support of the parties.210 The time and money both 
sides currently allocate toward policing websites for infringement 
and bringing or defending infringement lawsuits could be spent on 
creating new technology.211 A safe harbor clarification will also close 
the “floodgates” to the large amount of ongoing litigation arising 
from uncertainties in the law.212 
3.  The DMCA Must Evolve Along with Technology 
Finally, the variety and quality of services on the Internet have 
grown far beyond what Congress envisioned when it drafted the 
DMCA in 1998.213 Because the Copyright Clause of the Constitution 
grants Congress the power to promote the “useful arts,”214 a 
legislative amendment to the safe harbor provisions will ensure that 
traditional forms of media will continue to evolve in the digital 
age.215 Amending the safe harbor provisions to provide clearly 
defined protection to ISPs will also ensure that the United States 
continues to be a leader in the global marketplace for innovations.216 
Otherwise, the threat of liability for copyright infringement and the 
 
 209. See Eric Goldman, Want to End the Litigation Epidemic? Create Lawsuit-Free Zones, 
FORBES (Apr. 10, 2013, 2:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/04/10/want-to 
-end-the-litigation-epidemic-create-lawsuit-free-zones (“Section 512 runs for thousands of words, 
creating dozens of different vectors to attack a safe harbor defense. As a result, with so many 
more words to fight over, Section 512 judicial opinions are typically much lengthier—and more 
expensive to the litigants—than Section 230 opinions.”). 
 210. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 22–25 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 211. See Brodzinski, supra note 15, at 103 (“Such a reduction in the restrictiveness of 
copyrights would not mean an end to authorial prosperity, but would rather be an opportunity to 
profit in new ways, and would allow more freedom for the investment that drives innovation.”). 
 212. See Landsman, supra note 16, at 1. 
 213. See Maria A. Pallante, supra note 15, at 329 (“On the one hand, it is our best model of 
future-leaning legislation. On the other hand, fifteen years have passed, and the world—including 
most notably the Internet—has evolved.”). 
 214. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 215. See Kravets, supra note 10. 
 216. See THE TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INNOVATION, THE KNOWLEDGE 
ECONOMY: IS THE UNITED STATES LOSING ITS COMPETITIVE EDGE? 1 (2005), available at http:// 
cte.ed.gov/nationalinitiatives/gandctools_viewfile.cfm?d=600189; About the Task Force on 
American Innovation, TASK FORCE ON AMERICAN INNOVATION, http://www.innovationtaskforce 
.org/index.php?p=1_4 (last visited Aug. 7, 2013) (“Innovation is central to American jobs, 
competitiveness, and prosperity. In today’s world, many nations compete very well on the basis 
of cost or quality. It is the ability to innovate—to create new high-value, high-margin goods and 
services—that sets a country, a state, or a locality apart.”). 
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lack of clearly defined protections will deter innovators from 
creating new technologies. 
C.  Supreme Court Clarification Is Only a Temporary Solution 
A Supreme Court ruling that attempts to remedy the confusion 
over the interpretation of the safe harbors in the lower courts will 
only temporarily solve the problem.217 A congressional amendment 
to the safe harbor provisions under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), using the 
issues exemplified by Second and Ninth Circuit case law, will allow 
Congress to address and solve the original DMCA’s weaknesses.218 
Without a statutory amendment, lower courts will perpetuate the 
confusion that resulted from UMG Recordings and Viacom. ISPs will 
continue to face the great burden of using time and money to actively 
police user-loaded content to avoid the threat of defending 
themselves in ever-impending litigation. ISPs’ fear of liability—and 
large monetary penalties that accompany putting on a defense, even 
with the safe harbors on their side—will discourage the creation of 
new technologies.219 Further, existing ISPs will be forced to establish 
strict user policies to prevent individuals from posting potentially 
infringing content for which the ISP could be held liable. This, in 
turn, will discourage individuals from posting content online.220 The 
freedom to create, share, and use cutting-edge technologies will be 
stifled. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
U.S. copyright law represents a set of values that are 
quintessentially American: freedom, progress, property, and striving 
for a perfect balance between practicality and creativity. Since the 
first copyright law’s enactment, Congress and the courts have 
endeavored to strike that perfect balance between providing 
copyright protection for authors and promoting progress. At the 
 
 217. See Brodzinski, supra note 15, at 103 (“[B]ecause policy is often open to varying 
interpretations, it is important that Congress amend current copyright law in order to create a 
stable, lower liability environment for content-hosting sites, which are a necessary step on current 
technological advancement, and the investors that make such sites possible.”). 
 218. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 30, § 12A.17 (“At the same time that 
Congress intended to redress certain problems by enacting the provisions [of the DMCA], it 
realized that the world of the Internet is still quite young, and may yet evolve in unanticipated 
directions.”). 
 219. Seidenberg, supra note 145, at 1. 
 220. Id. 
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dawn of the new millennium, achieving this balance became a 
greater challenge as the law struggled to keep up with new 
technologies developing at light speed. These technologies have 
resulted in online forums, such as Napster, Veoh, Grooveshark, and 
YouTube, which have both revolutionized traditional media and 
blurred the lines of legal responsibility and liability for digital 
copyright infringement. Because of the speed at which technology 
changes in our digital culture, it is nearly impossible to keep 
copyright legislation current.221 The responsibility must therefore fall 
on Congress to resolve the conflict over DMCA interpretation 
between the authors and innovators, by amending the safe harbor 
provisions. 
Judicial interpretation, rather than creating clearly defined safe 
harbor provisions, has resulted in a convoluted and confusing area of 
copyright law for both the copyright holders and the ISPs. Chief 
Judge Kozinski wisely cautioned his fellow Ninth Circuit judges that 
“[o]verprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as 
underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a rich public 
domain. Nothing today, likely nothing since we tamed fire, is 
genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology, grows by 
accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who came 
before.”222 A legislative amendment to the DMCA safe harbors will 
resolve the confusion created by convoluted judicial interpretations 
by effectively providing the perfect amount of copyright protection 
to digital embodiments of traditional, copyright-protected works. To 
ensure that innovators will continue to create new technologies that 
benefit the public, Congress must reassure ISPs that they will not be 
punished for copyright infringement because of the actions of the 
users of their innovations. Congress must therefore draft specific 
statutory definitions of the safe harbor provisions stating that a 
copyright holder cannot hold an ISP liable for the infringing acts of 
its users, unless the ISP is aware of the infringement and fails to act 
or is itself committing copyright infringement. 
In conclusion, to ensure that new technologies continue to 
evolve and to create an environment of economic prosperity for both 
 
 221. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998); Lemley, supra note 62, at 113. 
 222. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
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old and new media, Congress must redraft the safe harbor provisions 
to provide clearly defined and adequate protection to the ISPs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
